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NEW INSIGHTS FROM OLD BOOKS
The Case of Alfred Thayer Mahan
Jon Sumida
Alfred Thayer Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783,which appeared in 1890, is widely regarded as the first important study of
the relationship between naval affairs and international politics. Mahan subse-
quently published twenty-odd additional volumes that extended and elaborated
the views presented in this book. On the present occasion, an article based upon
the traditional summary of Mahan’s main ideas could be justified as an obliga-
tory nod to the U.S. Navy’s intellectual heritage, or as an act of faith in the ca-
pacity of patristic writing to inspire strategic
insight. Recent scholarship, however, has demon-
strated that Mahan’s thinking about sea power has
been fundamentally misunderstood. This article
will thus examine three areas where the new inter-
pretation of Mahan affects consideration of prob-
lems that are of interest today. The first is naval and
military cooperation when fighting in inland or
coastal waters; the second is the nature and role of
naval supremacy with respect to a complex world
system of trade; and the third arises from the re-
quirements of higher naval education in a period of
rapid technological change. In other words,Mahan’s
work will be related to jointness and power projec-
tion from the sea, the expansion of the global econ-
omy, and the “revolution in naval affairs.”
There are three main arguments. First, Mahan
believed that when one side in a conflict possessed
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absolute sea command or in special cases even temporary local control, naval
operations in direct support of land forces could be of decisive importance. Sec-
ond,Mahanmaintained that naval supremacy in the twentieth century would be
exercised by a transnational consortium acting in defense of amultinational sys-
tem of free trade. Third,Mahan was convinced that the transformation of naval
materiel by radical technological change had not eliminated tactical and strate-
gic uncertainty from the conduct of war, and that the improvement of executive
ability through the rigorous study of history should therefore be the basis of na-
val officer education.
Mahan is often portrayed—because of misreadings of fragments of his writ-
ing, or all too often upon no reading of the original texts at all—as a purveyor of
truisms about naval strategy and doctrine. The resulting caricature is frequently
either misapplied or dismissed as outdated. This article, which is informed by
the study of all of Mahan’s major publications and surviving correspondence,
should remind us of the merits of the adage, “When you want a good new idea,
read an old book.”
A COMPLEX PICTURE OF THE INTERRELATED DYNAMICS
Alfred Thayer Mahan was an officer in the Union navy during the Civil War. He
was never a participant in a major battle, but his active service included many
months of inshore work in small warships enforcing the blockade of the Con-
federate coast. Nearly two decades after the end of hostilities, Mahan accepted a
commission to write a book about naval operations on the Caribbean coast and
up the Mississippi and Red Rivers in the war. In addition to drawing upon his
own experience during this conflict, Mahan studied memoirs and documents,
and corresponded with veterans from both sides. The completed work, which
was entitled The Gulf and Inland Waters, was published in 1883. Several years af-
ter the appearance of Influence of Sea Power upon History and its two-volume se-
quel, The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, which
came out in 1892, Mahan produced a biography of the admiral who had com-
manded most of the Union operations described in his first book. Admiral
Farragut, which was published in 1897, gave Mahan another opportunity to
present his views on fighting in littoral and interior waters that involved cooper-
ation between the army and navy.
During the American CivilWar, the lack of a fleet meant that the Confederacy
could not mount an effective challenge to Union control of the high seas.More-
over, the naval weakness of the southern states exposed their vital internal
riverine communications and major ports to seaborne assault. Over the course
of the four-year conflict, the territorial integrity and economic vitality of the
South were compromised by the integrated action of the Union army and navy,
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which established Federal control of the Mississippi and captured New Orleans
andMobile.Mahan’s two accounts of these campaigns demonstrate that he pos-
sessed considerable knowledge of the special characteristics of “brown water”
fighting, appreciated the necessity of connecting the activity of land and naval
forces, and recognized that the success of joint operations had been amajor con-
tributor to the ultimate Union victory.
In books written before and after the Farragut biography, Mahan criticized
Admiral Horatio Nelson’s advocacy of amphibious operations in support of land
campaigns and, in general, opposed overseas expeditions. But these views were
applied to circumstances in which
the opposing side possessed—or
was supposed to possess—the ca-
pacity to dispute sea command.
Mahan reasoned that in such a
case any attempt to project power
from water to land risked naval assets that were needed to preserve the general
control of the oceans, upon which all depended.When the maintenance of mar-
itime lines of communication was not an issue, he had no objection to using na-
val force in combination with an army to achieve a military objective, and he
well understood that such action could have great strategic value.
Indeed, Mahan attributed his initial inspiration—for the idea that naval su-
premacy was of much larger historical significance than was generally recog-
nized—to his reflections on a historical case involving the use of uncontested
command of the sea to achieve decisive military success. In his memoirs, he re-
called that in 1885 he had chanced upon TheodorMommsen’s history of ancient
Rome.While reading this book, Mahan had been struck by the thought that the
outcome of the wars between Rome andCarthage would have been different had
the latter possessed the ability, as did the former, of using the sea as an avenue of
invasion instead of moving its armies over land.
After some reflection,Mahan decided to apply the example of the victory of a
state that could use naval force effectively over one that could not to the history
of European wars in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This resulted
in the first of the “influence of sea power” volumes, in which Mahan closed the
introduction with a lengthy examination of the naval aspects of Rome’s defeat of
Carthage. He ended the main narrative of The Influence of Sea Power upon His-
tory with an account of the British defeat at Yorktown in 1781. The outcome of
this battle had been determined by the reinforcement of American and French
armies by sea, and also by French naval control of surrounding waters, which
had prevented a British fleet from relieving the besieged British army. The
Yorktown disaster had prompted negotiations that ultimately ended the war and
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established American independence. In the book that made his reputation,
Mahan thus used the survival of what was to become imperial Rome and the cre-
ation of the United States as powerful historical testaments to the transcendent
value of naval force in support of military operations.
But The Influence of Sea Power upon History also introduced a set of proposi-
tions about the relationship between the economic basis of national strength
and the development and effective use of a navy. Seaborne trade, Mahan main-
tained in his first best-seller, was a critically important generator of wealth. In
the event of war, a nation that could protect its own maritime commerce while
disrupting that of its opponent could shift the balance of national resources de-
cisively in its own favor. A fleet capable of winning and keeping command of the
sea was required to accomplish both of these tasks. In peace, therefore, a great
state was well advised to do everything it could to build the strongest possible
navy. Over time, the cumulative effect of sound naval policy and strategy in
peace and war was economic prosperity and territorial aggrandizement.
Naval force structure and deployment were also important variables. Cruiser
attacks on scattered shipping, Mahan believed, were incapable of inflicting pro-
hibitive losses on a large merchant marine. Blockade of the enemy’s main
ports—implemented by a fleet of battleships capable of defeating any force that
was sent against it—was the only way to accomplish the complete or near com-
plete stoppage of overseas commerce required to achieve a significant strategic
effect against a greatmaritime power. It was for this reason thatMahanmade the
number of battleships the measure of naval potency, and the destruction of the
enemy battle fleet through decisive engagement—for the purposes of either se-
curing or breaking a blockade—themain operational objective of naval strategy.
These interrelated arguments addressed major concerns of Mahan’s own
time. From the 1880s, the general expansion of European navies in response to
increasing imperial rivalry was accompanied by intensive debate over the rela-
tive merits of a naval strategy based on commerce raiding by cruisers, as op-
posed to one based on command of the sea by battleships. In addition, the
advent of steam propulsion andmetal hulls had vastly increased the efficiency of
maritime transport, which in turn caused a sharp upturn in overseas commerce
and the wealth generated by this kind of activity. Mahan’s choice of European
great power conflict during the late age of sail as the vehicle for his argument also
favored discussion of the general struggle for naval supremacy in preference to
case studies of combined operations along coasts and rivers. So although
Mahan clearly recognized the importance of power projection from sea to
land, it was his examination of the contest for command of the sea, and its
political-economic consequences, that created the immediate and wide audience
for The Influence of Sea Power upon History and later publications. The resulting
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association of Mahan with arguments exclusively about naval supremacy dis-
torted perceptions of his identity as a strategic theorist, setting the stage for mis-
leading comparisons with writers (such as C. E. Callwell and Julian Corbett)
who focused more on the relationship of land and sea power. But a far greater
problem was created by the serious misunderstanding of the basic character of
Mahan’s rendition of European naval history in the age of sail, a misperception
that led to faulty inferences aboutMahan’s fundamental views on grand strategy.
The “influence of sea power” series began in the mid-seventeenth century
with a situation in which threemajormaritime states—France, the Netherlands,
and England—were roughly balanced with respect to naval prowess and accom-
plishment. It ended in the early
nineteenth century with the wars
of the French Revolution and Em-
pire, during which Britain’s Royal
Navymore or less ruled the waves.
In addition to the two works
named previously, which provided an overview of the entire period, Mahan
wrote two supporting case studies: a biography of Admiral Nelson, and an ac-
count of theWar of 1812. In terms of “plot,” the entire series could be read as the
story of the rise of Britain’s naval supremacy and its consequent achievement of
economic and political preeminence in Europe. In terms of “moral,” the series
seemed to say that Britain’s sustained and aggressive use of a large fleet to obtain
territory, wealth, and power could be emulated by any state that had the mind
and will to follow its example.
Mahan, it appeared to many, had intended his analytical history to be a grand
strategic primer for his own times, and in particular for the government of his
own country.He was indeed a proponent of a much strengthened U.S.Navy. It is
thus not hard to imagine that he hoped that his homeland would become the
world’s greatest power in the twentieth century by the same means that Britain
had used to achieve this status in the period covered by his histories. The fact
that the United States ultimately rose to the top in large part through the effec-
tive use of naval supremacy has only reinforced the propensity to draw such in-
ferences about Mahan’s underlying motive.
But careful consideration of Mahan’s actual writing in the “influence of sea
power” series, of his political-economic outlook, and of his punditry about the
future course of world politics makes it impossible to accept the foregoing
characterizations of his account of naval warfare in the late age of sail and of its
intended application to the twentieth century. The first installment of the “in-
fluence of sea power” series is about the failure of France to exploit its maritime
assets properly, a failure that in Mahan’s view allowed Britain to achieve major
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successes in war virtually by default. Mahan chose to close the book with a dis-
proportionately lengthy account of the American Revolution, a conflict in
which sound French policy and deployments resulted in Britain’s defeat and the
loss of a vast and rich colonial territory. In the wars of the French Revolution and
Empire, in contrast, the navy of France was compromised from the start by po-
litical upheaval and institutional disintegration. The second installment was
thus about Britain’s use of naval supremacy to contain a militarily preeminent
France through a strategy of attrition. Mahan did not hold that the ultimate
outcome had been preordained—that is, that naval supremacy as such guaran-
teed victory. The triumph of Britain, given the evenness of the balance between
the opposing sides, he argued in both the second and the third installments,
depended upon extraordinary operational naval leadership—in the person of
Nelson. In the concluding fourth installment, Mahan’s main theme was that in-
adequate American naval strength was the fundamental explanation of diplo-
matic failure before the War of 1812 and of naval operational impotence, with
all its attendant serious strategic drawbacks, during the conflict.
Britain and British naval strategy did not, in short, represent the focus of the
“influence of sea power” series. Mahan’s histories did not constitute a simple
morality play about a single state acting according to a prescribed general course
of action; they offered instead a complex picture of the interrelated dynamics of
naval andmaritime commercial activity on the one hand, and international pol-
itics on the other. Mahan’s essentially liberal political-economic views, more-
over, led him to reject the mercantilist conception of a world consisting of
competing players with mutually exclusive interests. Mahan believed that free
trade between nations promoted increases in the volume of international ex-
changes of goods, which worked to the benefit of all participants. The great
expansion of French overseas shipping after the War of the Spanish Succession,
he argued in the first installment of the “influence of sea power” series, was at-
tributable to peace and the removal of restrictions on commerce, not to govern-
ment initiatives. In the second installment, Mahan observed that sea power was
an organism that included not only organized naval force but free maritime en-
terprise.While the former depended upon state funding and direction, the latter
thrived in the absence of government interference. During the wars of the
French Revolution and Empire,Mahan maintained, the British state was able to
exploit the prosperity produced by an international sea-basedmercantile system
that it could protect but did not possess. Britain was not, in other words, the
owner of sea power but its custodian.
Mahan believed that Britain had been both the defender and main benefi-
ciary of seaborne trade in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries be-
cause its parliament had been dominated by a small group of men with close
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ties to maritime commerce. Such an oligarchy had been predisposed to heavy
spending on the navy, producing a fleet strong enough to defend a merchant
marine that carried a large proportion of the world’s overseas trade. Over the
course of the nineteenth century, however, the democratization of the British
political system undercut the ma-
nipulation of government policy
by a mercantile elite. As a conse-
quence, Mahan argued, the Brit-
ish state of the late nineteenth and
twentieth century lost the will to
finance a navy capable of defending what had become a much larger and in-
creasingly multinational system of oceanic economic exchange. Moreover, in
Mahan’s view, no single democratized power would be capable of assuming such
a burden. For this reason—and because he was convinced that free trade condi-
tions provided large benefits to all major maritime countries—Mahan con-
cluded that in the twentieth century, naval supremacy would be exercised by a
transnational consortium of navies. The basis of such a system, he insisted,
would not be formal agreement but the absence of important conflicts of politi-
cal interest, coupled to a common stake in the security of a highly productive
form of economic activity. Mahan was thus convinced that Britain and the
United States would cooperate without recourse to a treaty and that in such a re-
lationship the latter would serve as the junior partner. To play even this support-
ing role effectively, Mahan insisted, America needed a larger navy. He did not
advocate the creation of an American navy that was stronger than every other
unless the British navy was weakened by inadequate financing or by war with a
European competitor.
Mahan offered his views on the future course of international affairs in sev-
eral book-length monographs and in periodical articles that were later collected
and published as books. In them Mahan contemplated a range of possible
courses of events. These included the containment of an expansionist Russia by
an international coalition, war between Britain and Germany, and even a cata-
clysmic collision between European and Asian civilizations.What he did not do
was apply a crude reading of the great-power contests of the late age of sail to the
industrial future and thereby imagine the rise of a hegemonic United States
through offensive naval warfare and mercantilist economic policy. While his
realist temperament prompted him to argue that war and the threat of war were
likely to be facts of life for the foreseeable future, Mahan did not rule out either
the possibility or desirability of general peace founded upon the workings of an
international system of free trade. In such a world economy, he was confident,
106 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW
Mahan devoted as much attention to the stra-
tegic direction of naval operations as he did to
the relationship between naval supremacy and
the course of international politics.
7
Sumida: New Insights from Old Books
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2001
the energy and entrepreneurial spirit of the American people would enable
them to compete successfully.
In the second half of the nineteenth century, the onset of industrialization
transformed naval materiel within the span of a generation.WhenMahan was a
midshipman at the U.S. Naval Academy, just before the American Civil War, he
was trained on wooden sailing ships armed with muzzle-loading guns. By the
time he retired from the service at the end of the century, steel warships pro-
pelled by steam and equipped with breech-loading weapons of much larger size
and power had become standard. The sudden obsolescence, as a result of rapid
technical change, of much of what had constituted traditional naval fighting
practice and the virtually worldwide sense that what now really mattered in war
was the possession of the latest, and therefore most capable, naval armaments
undermined the self-confidence of naval executive leaders. Conversely, naval of-
ficer technicians could celebrate the wonders of technical improvement and
claim that the critical importance of qualitative advantage in materiel made
their activity central to the efficiency of the Navy. Moreover, administrative
burdens had been magnified by the management needs of the new technology
and also by the expansion of the American fleet that had begun in the 1880s;
these factors created a large class of naval officer bureaucrats with pretensions
to higher status not directly connected to traditional requirements for com-
mand at sea.
The relative decline of naval officer executives alarmedMahan. By dint of in-
tellectual patrimony and personal experience in the greatest conflict ever fought
by his service up to his time, he had decided opinions on the paramount value of
effective leadership in war and how it might be developed.Mahan’s father, Den-
nis Hart Mahan, a distinguished professor at the U.S. Military Academy at West
Point, had believed that great executive leadership was of crucial importance in
war. The elder Mahan had observed that at critical junctures, commanders
would be confronted with complex, contingent, changing, and contradictory in-
formation, which meant that decision making could never be reduced to the
mechanistic application of rules or principles. Development of the tempera-
ment required for sound judgment under such circumstances, Dennis Hart
Mahan was convinced, could be aided by the study of detailed and analytically
rigorous operational history. There can be little doubt that this outlook was im-
parted to his son, and thereafter reinforced by the youngerMahan’s direct obser-
vation of command decision making in the Civil War. Alfred Thayer Mahan’s
first publication, in 1879, was an essay on naval education in which he attacked
what he regarded as the overemphasis on technical subjects and called for much
greater attention to the study of what amounted to the liberal arts. Such an ap-
proach, he maintained, would develop the moral qualities that officers required
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to be able to make decisions in the face of danger and uncertainty. The vital role
of moral strength with respect to executive command, along with the appropri-
ate means of improving it in naval officers, became a theme in Mahan’s later
writing that was no less important to him than his examination of the relation-
ship between naval affairs and international politics.
In The Influence of Sea Power upon History,Mahan argued that although tactics
changed as the character of armaments altered, the validity of the basic princi-
ples of strategy were relatively unaffected by technical progress, and human
character was an absolute, a constant. History, therefore, might have little to say
of current applicability to tactics
but a great deal that was pertinent
to strategy and operational com-
mand. Mahan devoted as much
attention in the main narrative of
this work to the strategic direc-
tion of naval operations as he did to his grand strategic argument about the rela-
tionship between naval supremacy and the course of international politics. He
also made a few observations about the critical effect of individual moral char-
acter on the exercise of naval command. In later installments of the “influence of
sea power” series, he remained no less attentive to strategic questions and,
through his treatment of Nelson’s leadership qualities, wrote at length about the
moral dimensions of executive decision making in war.
In several of his articles,Mahanmaintained that the essence of effective com-
mand comprised rapid and judicious risk taking and full responsibility for out-
comes. This set of characteristics was alien to the scientific mentalité of the
engineer, who dealt deliberately with the discovery of certainty about physical
matters through controlled experiment, and to the bureaucratized mindset of
the administrator, who countenanced delay and fragmented accountability. In
peace, an executive leader had few if any opportunities either to display his ca-
pacity for war command or to acquire experience that would enable him to
develop it, while technicians and bureaucrats flourished in the pursuit of engi-
neering innovation or administrative expansion. For Mahan, therefore, serious
naval history, of the kind that he had produced in the “influence of sea power”
series, served two major practical functions. First, it reminded the navy of what
executive war command was and why it was important; second, it provided a
sound educational basis for developing that capacity in officers who had no war
experience. The latter task was accomplished through stories about naval deci-
sionmaking in war, narratives that prompted readers to imagine the psychologi-
cal dynamics as well as material circumstances that condition the direction of
operations in real conflicts.
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Mahan lacked the powers of technical ratiocination that were needed to eval-
uate properly a complex engineering problem, such as capital-ship design. His
criticisms in the early twentieth century of the all-big-gun battleship, therefore,
failed to take into account several significant factors that exposed his analysis to
swift and thorough destruction. But neither was Mahan a naval technological
Luddite. If he was a critic of many of the claims made for mechanical innova-
tion, it was because he was convinced that such progress had not eliminated un-
certainty from decision making in war, and that the decadence of the naval
executive ethos that had resulted was thus a dangerous weakness.His antidote to
the technological determinists of his time, however, was history rather than po-
litical science; he believed that the verisimilitude afforded by detailed narrative
about things that had actually happened could engage the minds and feelings of
students of command in ways that summarized lessons or abstractions could
not. Mahan’s preference for historical representation over the construction of
explanatory systems when dealing with the past is in line with much that has
been argued recently by proponents of chaos and complexity theory. Further, his
remedy for moral dilemmas—confidence in intelligent intuition—is one that is
supported today by the findings of cognitive science. Viewed in light of these
modern, cutting-edge inquiries into human learning and behavior, the writings
of Mahan may be regarded as not just relevant but revelatory.
A COGNITIVE POINT OF DEPARTURE
For nearly a hundred years, Alfred Thayer Mahan’s pronouncements on naval
affairs and international politics were too famous to be ignored but also too
extensive, difficult, and complicated to be easily understood as a whole. From
the start, most writers on naval history and strategy misperceived his work, and
successive generations compounded the errors of their predecessors, creating a
large literature whose shortcomings further obstructed access to the meaning of
the original texts. As a consequence, Mahan’s basic ideas have been misrepre-
sented as follows: first, sea control was always the central question of naval strat-
egy; second, the ideal of national grand strategy was the achievement of naval
supremacy as the prerequisite to international economic and political pre-
eminence; and third, success in naval warfare depended upon the correct appli-
cation of certain principles of strategy. These propositions add little to current
naval discussions, which consider the American possession of sea control and a
monopoly on superpower status virtually as givens, and which are preoccupied
by the transformation of fighting practice through radical technological
innovation.
The major arguments of Mahan that can be found through comprehensive
and rigorous critical examination, however, are very different from what has
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been supposed. Moreover, the issues that prompted him to put pen to paper
were remarkably similar to those of today. He began both his naval and writing
careers dealing with joint operations in coastal waters. Mahan was confronted
by the rapid expansion of a global system of free trade; by uncertainty about
what America’s proper naval role under such conditions should be; and by a
“revolution in naval affairs” that was occasioned by the replacement of pre-
industrial by industrial naval armaments and that in turn raised large questions
about the nature of wartime command and the education of those who would
exercise it.
Mahan’s contemplation of these problems produced the following conclusions.
First, close cooperation between land and sea forces is essential for the success of
joint operations, whose outcomes can determine the victor in a major war. Second,
because the cost of building and maintaining a navy that is strong enough to
command the seas unilaterally will be too high for any single power, sea control in
the twentieth century and beyond would be the responsibility of a transnational
consortium of navies. Third, great advances in technology do not diminish reliance
upon the good judgment of naval executive leaders, who could best be prepared for
effective high-level decision making in war by the proper study of history.
Identifying Mahan’s true basic attitudes toward power projection from sea to
land, naval supremacy, and the relationship between technological change and
naval officer education does more than correct academic error. What have been
believed to be Mahan’s ideas created a body of theory that still—whether
through acceptance, modification, or rejection—forms part of the thought
processes of most senior naval officers. Changing what has for so long been a
cognitive point of departure, therefore, has significant implications for anyone
concerned with the future of naval policy. Mahan has been widely regarded as
the discoverer of what he supposedly believed were universal truths about naval
strategy that were to be applied directly. The fact is, however, thatMahan’s prop-
ositions were observations about particular phenomena rather than general les-
sons.When dealing withMahan, the focus of inquiry should therefore not be his
statement of principle or delineation of precedent but his choice of issues, and
the complexities of the historical cases that were his main subjects. The crucial
linkages between his past and our present, in other words, are not to be found in
his conclusions but in his questions and his conduct of the inquiry. These are
still worth engaging, because Mahan faced problems that were similar to those
that confront navies today, and he brought to them a powerful intelligence that
was informed by rich experience and wide reading. History was the venue for
Mahan’s scholarly labors, because he understood both the limits of theory and
the power of narrative when it came to matters of human behavior and social
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organization under the conditions of war. There is much more that can and
should be written about the general and particular aspects of navies and naval
power, but approaching, let alone matching, the intellectual standard of Mahan’s
pioneering achievement will not be easy.
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